Abstract: This paper studies a unique buyback method allowing firms to reacquire their own shares on a separate trading line where only the firm is allowed to buy shares. This temporary trading platform is opened concurrently with the original trading line on the stock exchange. This share repurchase method is called the Second Trading Line and has been extensively used by Swiss companies since 1997. This type of repurchase is unique for two reasons. First, unlike open market programs, the repurchasing company does not trade under the cover of anonymity. Second, all transactions made by the repurchasing firm are publicly available in real time to every market participant. This is a case of instantaneous disclosure which contrasts sharply with other markets characterized by delayed or no disclosure. Using actual repurchase data from all buybacks implemented through second trading lines, we find that managers exhibit timing ability for the majority of programs. We also document that the daily repurchase decision is statistically associated with short-term price changes. However, we reject the opportunistic repurchase hypothesis and find no evidence that managers exploit their information advantage when reacquiring shares. We also find that repurchases on the second trading line have a beneficial impact on the liquidity of repurchasing firms (i.e., higher trading volumes, smaller bid-ask spreads, and thicker total depths). Exchanges and regulators may consider the second trading line an attractive share reacquisition mechanism because of its transparency and positive liquidity effects.
Introduction
Stock repurchases are nowadays a common way for companies to distribute cash to their shareholders. They are also frequently used to signal undervaluation (Vermaelen, 1981) , mitigate agency problems (Jensen, 1986) , finance or counter the dilution effects of stock option plans (Kahle, 2002) , alter leverage ratios (Bagwell and Shoven, 1988) , or fend off takeovers (Bagwell, 1991) . Recent empirical research has made tremendous progress in understanding the main motives for firms to repurchase their own shares.
1 Careful attention has also been devoted to the usually positive stock return drift observed subsequent to share buyback announcements.
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The vast majority of buybacks are implemented through open market programs, in which listed companies directly buy their own shares in the stock market. This buyback method represents 90% of all repurchase programs in the US (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998 ) and 87%
of all repurchase programs in the rest of the world (Vermaelen, 2005) . The main features of the open market programs are that (1) the repurchasing firm trades anonymously in the stock market and (2) the actual number of repurchased shares and the repurchase price are not always disclosed. 3 An implication of this opaque environment is that open market programs may lower the liquidity of repurchasing firms. Indeed, the presence of informed managers in the stock market increases the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread (Barclay and Smith, 1988) . This assertion has been recently corroborated by Brockman and Chung (2001) in the ir empirical study of actual buyback data from the Hong Kong stock market. They find that spreads increase on average by more than 10% on repurchase days. A similar conclusion is reached by Ginglinger and Hamon (2005) using French data.
Another implicatio n of the lack of information on open market programs is that little is known about the actual implementation of stock repurchase programs. In the U.S. stock market, since most companies repurchase their shares through open market programs with no disclosure requirement, researchers are forced to use monthly or quarterly proxies for share repurchase activity (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998) or questionnaires returned by repurchasing companies (Cook, Krigman and Leach, 2003, 2004) . 4 In particular, it is still an open question whether managers opportunistically use their information advantage around corporate announcements when reacquiring shares on behalf of the company.
We present in this paper an alternative repurchase method. This technique allows firms to reacquire shares on a s eparate market segment, called second trading line, where the repurchasing company is the only entity authorized to acquire shares. This temporary trading platform is opened concurrently with the original trading line on the stock exc hange. The second trading line technique has been used by Swiss companies since 1997 and is now the most popular share acquisition method in Switzerland. This type of repurchase is unique for two reasons. First, unlike open market programs, the repurchasing company does not act under the cover of anonymity. As a result, this institutional design creates a natural experiment to study the effect of buybacks on the liquidity of the original trading line in absence of the adverse selection problem identified by Barclay and Smith (1988) . Second, these separate trading lines offer a unique resource for analyzing the actual implementation of share repurchases. Indeed, all transactions made by the repurchasing firm on a second trading line are recorded by the Swiss stock exchange and are instantaneously disclosed to all market participant s.
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There are other important features of the second trading line. The price paid by the firm on the second trading line can differ from the concurrent price on the standard first trading line. The premium on the second trading line is limited by law to 5% and turns out to be rather small in practice. As a result, this type of repurchase fulfills the principle of equal treatment of all shareholders, i.e., those who participate in the buyback program and those who do not.
Indeed, unlike Dutch auction offers or tender offers, there is no damaging dilution effects on non-selling shareholders caused by substantial premia paid to selling shareholders. 6 Furthermore, no disclosure requirements are needed since market participants and financial regulatory authorities can follow in real time the firm's repurchases. On the practical side, the second trading lines allow the repurchasing companies to easily collect the withholding tax that has to be transferred to the Swiss tax authorities in every buyback leading to the cancellation of the shares.
The first objective of this paper is to study the timing of stock repurchases. We investigate whether managers exhibit buyback implementation skills when repurchasing shares. We define buyback implementation skills as the capability to purchase shares at a relatively low price. We use two measures of skills: the first one simply contrasts the actual cost of a given buyback program to the average cost of a random buyback plan that yields the same number of reacquired shares; the second one is a novel measure that is consistent with the fact that a buyback program is an option owned by the firm to buyback stock, as suggested in Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) . In our sample, we find that managers exhibit timing ability for the majority of programs. In particular, some companies are able to repurchase shares at the lowest possible price during their buyback.
Buyback implementation skills can be demonstrated by active repurchase activities following price drops or in advance of price increases. Such trading patterns may be related to managers' inside information. Indeed, when implementing buyback programs, management teams have the opportunity to exploit their information advantage around corporate announcements on behalf of the repurchasing firm. The opportunistic repurchase hypothesis would be corroborated by particularly intense repurchase activities around the release of firm specific information, and especially prior to the release of good firm-specific news, and following the release of bad firm-specific news. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one empirical study (Cook, Krigman and Leach, 2004 ) that analyzes the relationship between firm-specific news and the daily repurchase decision of firms. They report that firms refrain from repurchasing around public announcements. Since their dataset has been voluntary disclosed by the companies, this result is not overwhelmingly surprising. Using our unique 6 In Dutch auction offers, shareholders submit to the firm quantities and prices at which they are willing to sell their shares (Comment and Jarrell, 1991) . The share price eventually paid is the minimum one allowing the repurchasing firms to reacquire the targeted number of shares. Tender offers are fixed-price offers (Vermaelen, 1984) . When the number of tendered shares exceeds the targeted number of shares, the company can either expand its offer or buy shares proportionally.
dataset, we examine this question using an innovative methodology contrasting pre-and postannouncement periods, as well as trading patterns around good and bad news releases. We uncover evidence that the daily repurchase decision is strongly associated with (past and future) short-term price changes. However, in our sample, we reject the opportunistic repurchase hypothesis and find no evidence of firms increasing their repurchases before releasing good news or after disclosing bad news.
Our second objective is to analyze the impact of share buybacks on the liquidity of the repurchasing firm on the first trading line. As second trading lines are open concurrently with first trading lines in the Swiss stock exchange, it is likely that this parallel trading affects in some way the liquidity of the underlying stock. When share buybacks take place on a separate trading line, existing theories linking buybacks and market liquidity do not straightforwardly apply. Repurchasing firms do not compete directly with the liquidity providers on the first trading line (Barclay and Smith, 1988, and Cook, Krigman, and Leach, 2004) . Furthermore, this type of repurchase does not increase the probability of trading with an informed trader on the first trading line (Barclay and Smith, 1988, and Brockman and Chung, 2001) . In this paper, we posit that the impact of firms' repurchases on the liquidity of the underlying stock is generated in part by the information effect of actual buybacks. Since actual buybacks are instantaneously disclosed to all market participants, the firm sends a positive signal to the market every time it trades. We hypothesize that this signal attracts more investors to the market in reaction to firms' repurchases and consequently improve market liquidity.
Furthermore, the expected impact of repurchases on stock market liquidity also depends on the identity of the sellers. First, if second trading lines capture a substantial part of the trading volume of institutional investors, that otherwise would have taken place on the first trading line, the liquidity on the first trading line is likely to worsen. Second, if most transactions on second trading lines are made by arbitrageurs, who simultaneously buy on the first trading line and resell to the firm, the liquidity of the underlying stock is likely to improve. Indeed, arbitrage activity maintains a minimum price in the stock market, which tends to raise trading volumes and lower bid-ask spreads.
Our empirical results confirm that repurchases on the second trading line have an important impact on the liquidity of repurchasing firms. Specifically, the repurchasing firms' trading volumes and total depths on the first trading line tend to be higher on repurchase days and bid-ask spreads tend to be smaller on repurchase days. The evidence confirms that this unique parallel trading mechanism improves the liquidity of the underlying stock.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to analyze share repurchases implemented on an exchange with instantaneous buyback disclosure. While this method is only used in Switzerland, it can be of interest for exchanges and regulators in other countries because of its transparency and positive liquidity effects. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.
Section 2 describes the institutional and legal setting of stock repurchases in Switzerland, along with the participation rules for all types of stock market participants. Section 3 provides a detailed description of the dataset. We study the timing of share repurchases in Section 4.
Specifically, we assess the buyback implementation skills of managers and we study the effect of stock price evolution and firm-specific news on repurchase activity. We analyze the liquidity effects of stock repurchases in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 offers some concluding comments.
Share Repurchases in Switzerland

Institutional and Legal Setting
The first share repurchase program implemented by a company listed on the Swiss stock exchange took place in 1993 and since then 129 programs have been carried out (see Figure 1, upper graph). Swiss firms buy their own shares using four different buyback methods: open market, distribution of tradable European put options to all shareholders, tender offers, and repurchases on a second trading line. This last repurchasing technique was initiated in 1997 and has become very popular since then (see Figure 1 , lower graphs).
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Swiss corporate law states that, when shares are repurchased on a second trading line, share buybacks should not exceed 10% of the votes and firm's issued share capital, they should not take place ten days prior to the earnings announcement date, and the premium paid on a second trading line should not exceed 5% of the price prevailing in the stock market at the 7 The interruption in the use of put options between 1994 and 1999 is due to the fact that put options used to be taxed twice: first when granted and later when exercised. In 2000, the highest court in Switzerland ruled that options should only be taxed at the exercise date. Market participants can submit different types of orders: market orders, limit orders, hidden orders, and fill-or-kill orders. The observation of the two order books illustrates different aspects of this share repurchase mechanism. First, as expected, the firm is the only buyer on the second trading line. Second, first trading lines are much more active than second trading lines and, as a consequence, spreads tend to be wider on second trading lines. Third and unlike on first trading lines, posted orders are round lots on second trading lines. This is due the fact that only professional investors are selling shares on the second line as will be shown in the next subsection.
< Insert Figure 2 >
The growing popularity of the second trading line is mostly due to its great flexibility. Unlike distributions of put options or tender offers, second trading line programs do not commit the firm to acquire a specified number of shares at a fixed price. where P 2,t is the stock price on the second trading line and V is the nominal value of the stock.
The repurchasing company has to transfer the withholding tax to the tax authorities. When the firm is not able to identify the seller of the stock, the firm is personally responsible for paying the withholding tax. As fiscal authorities consider that the amount paid to shareholders has been deduced from withholding taxes, the company bears a 53.85% tax rate, i.e., 0.35 × (1 / 0.65) = 0.5385. This specific tax regime called for the creation of a new share acquisition 9 For foreign investors, the portion that can be reclaimed is determined by bilateral tax treaties. For instance, U.S. and British investors are eligible for a 20 percent points tax return. 10 Some institutional investors, such as pension funds and holdings, are totally exempted from taxes on dividends and capital gains. They still face the withholding tax though. 11 Swiss companies can hold treasury stock for up to six years. However, if at the end of this period the shares have not been resold in the market, the firm will have to pay the withholding tax. 12 Typically, for Swiss companies, the nominal value is less than 1% of the current market stock price.
mechanism allowing the firm to pay only the net price to the shareholders. The goal for the firm is to be able to collect immediately the withholding tax when the stock is tendered while keeping a flexible "open-market type" program. 13 Actually, on a second trading line, participating shareholders only get the price net of the withholding tax so that the company does not bear the risk of paying additional taxes. From the firm's perspective, the use of a second trading line is a tax-efficient way of cancelling shares.
Buyback Participation Rules
In order to better understand the functioning of the second trading line buybacks from a tax point of view, we study the conditions under which a given market participant may take part in a second trading line repurchase program. In particular, we wonder by which percentage (i.e., premium) the price on the second trading line has to exceed the current stock price to make the second trading line attractive to this participant. We consider successively individual investors, institutional investors, and arbitrageurs. We compute the reserve premium of each participant, which is defined as the premium for which the after-tax price on the second trading line is equal to the after-tax price on the first trading line. Consequently, when the actual premium p exceeds the reserve premium, the investor is better off selling her shares on the second trading line rather than in the stock market.
14 When an individual investor sells some shares in the stock market at the current stock price, no taxes are paid since capital gains are tax free for individual investors. If the same investor tenders her shares on the second trading line, she receives today the second trading line price net of the withholding tax. At the end of the fiscal year, she will be entitled to a full refund of the withholding tax and the difference between the repurchase price and the nominal value of the stock will be taxed as income. 
or equivalently, 13 Tender offers or put option-based repurchase programs also allow the company to pay only the net price but with much less flexibility since both the price and the number of shares are fixed. 14 The following analysis remains valid for foreign investors but they usually would not be entitled to a full refund of the withholding tax. As a result, their reserve premium is higher than the one of their domestic counterparts.
( )
where p * is the reserve premium for an individual investor, P is the market stock price, and t I is the marginal income tax rate. The discount factor d is defined as (1 + r) -τ where r is the risk-free rate with a τ maturity and τ is the time period from the transaction day to the end of the fiscal year.
When an institutional investor sells some shares in the stock market, capital gains are taxed at the effective marginal rate t G . If the same investor tenders her shares on the second trading line, she receives today the second trading line price minus the withholding tax. At the end of the fiscal year, she will be entitled to a full refund of the withholding tax and the difference between the repurchase price and the acquisition price will be taxed as capital gains. 
where p ** is the reserve premium for an institutional investor and A is the acquisition price of the stock. Notice that, since the acquisition price does not appear in the expression for the reserve premium, the latter is independent of the investor's capital gains or loss. In the eventuality that the institutional investor is exempted from capital gain tax, the participation rule becomes: 
where p *** is the reserve premium for a tax-exempted institutional investor. As expected the reserve premium is smaller when the institutional investor is exempted from taxes on capital gains.
As the firm's shares are traded concurrently on two parallel market segments, arbitrageurs may seek to exploit any significant price difference. A professional arbitrageur will accept to buy one share on the first trading line and to sell it on the second trading line if and only if her arbitrage profit is strictly positive: By simplifying the inequality above, we get Equation (2). Therefore, the reserve premium for an arbitrageur is equal to the reserve premium for an institutional investor.
The three reserve premia obtained above share a common structure. The numerator is the same in Equations (2) and (3) and this t erm also appears in Equation (1). This term corresponds to the opportunity cost of the withholding tax to the investor. Of course, the actual reserve premia will depend on the marginal tax rate of the different types of investors.
In two particular cases this opportunity cost is equal to zero. First, if the withholding tax was immediately returned to the seller (d = 1), which is equivalent to no withholding tax, the reserve premium of any institutional investor or arbitrageur would boil down to zero (p** = p*** = 0). In the case where d = 1, the reserve premium for an individual investor would remain strictly positive (p* > 0). This is due to the fact that an individual investor needs to be compensated for the income tax she has to pay on the difference between V and P when selling on a second trading line. Second, if the current stock price and the nominal value of the stock were equal (V / P = 1), the reserve premium of all market participants would be zero. This would correspond to the case where there would be no tax basis for paying the withholding tax. This result emphasizes the central role played by the V / P ratio in determining the magnitude of the premium.
We plot in Figure 3 the reserve premia for different market participants. For each market participant, we plot the associated reserve premium for a time period until the end of the fiscal year (τ) ranging from 0 to 1 year, different risk-free interest rate levels, r = 1%, 3%, and 5%, and different income tax rates (t I ) or capital gain tax rates (t G ), 30% and 50%. The value of the current stock price ( P) is assumed to be 100 and the nominal value of one share (V) is assumed to be 1. The reserve premium of an individual investor turns out to be very large, regardless of the magnitude of the key parameters. Since the premium is limited by law to 5%, we conclude that it is never optimal for an individual investor to sell shares on a second trading line. On the other hand, the reserve premium of institutional investors and arbitrageurs always remain below the legal threshold. As a result, the other market participants may accept to participate in a second trading line buyback program. In particular, if p ** < p, institutional investors and arbitrageurs may sell shares on the second trading line, and if p *** < p < p ** , only tax-exempted institutional investors may sell shares on the second trading line. The bottom line is that the tax treatment of second line trading makes it attractive for institutional and professional investors only. day/program observations. In addition, we collect from the Swiss Takeover Board website (www.copa.ch), the start and the end dates, the maximum cost and the percentage issued share capital reduction of each program, along with the main motives for repurchasing shares claimed by each firm. We also retrieve contemporaneous daily stock prices on the first trading line for all repurchasing companies from Thomson Financial Datastream. Furthermore, we collect from the same source the market capitalizations and book-to-market value ratios of the repurchasing companies during all programs.
Within a given repurchase program i, we measure the trading activity using four different variables, which capture different facets of stock repurchases. The first variable is a dummy variable that is assigned a value of one if the company repurchases any stock on day t, and 0 otherwise:
where SR i is the Swiss Franc repurchase. The second variable captures the intensity of the repurchase activity and is defined as the fraction of the announced program size repurchased on day t :
where Program Size i is the maximum cost of program i announced and authorized prior to the program implementation. The third variable is the percentage premium paid on the second trading line on a given day:
where P 1,i is the stock price on the first trading line while P 2,i is the stock price on the second trading line. The fourth variable is the completion rate, which is the percent of the program completed to date:
where t i start is the start date of program i. Firms set up second trading lines so that they can cancel their shares. Share buybacks for cancellation and cash dividends are complementary tools for returning cash to shareholders.
As reported in the lower panel of Table 1 , companies cancel their repurchased shares to show improvement in financial ratios and to alter capital structure. Another reason for canceling the shares is that a heavy tax penalty would be levied if firms keep the reacquired shares as treasury stock beyond a specified period (see Section 2.1). Figure 4 displays the daily repurchase activity of Swiss Re, Swatch Group, UBS, and
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Schindler. We clearly see in this figure that these firms adopt a variety of execution styles. 
Buyback Implementation Skills
We define the buyback implementation skills of managers as their ability in selecting repurchase days over the course of a given buyback program. In this context, a particularly skilled manager is able to reacquire shares at historical low prices. 15 In order to assess managers' timing skills, we first contrast the actual cost of a given buyback program, which is measured by adding up all daily Swiss Franc repurchases, C i , to the average cost of a random buyback plan that yields the same number of reacquired shares, i C . We call the In this paper, we propose a novel measure of managers' buyback implementation skills that is consistent with the fact that a buyback program is an option owned by the firm to buyback stock, as suggested in Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) . 16 Indeed, open market and second trading lines programs give managers give the opportunity -but not the obligation -to buyback shares during a given time period. In particular, they provide managers with the flexibility to forego repurchasing stock. Consistent with this analogy between buybacks and financial options, we compare on each repurchase day the price paid by the firm (i.e., the "strike price") to the average price during the rest of the buyback program (i.e., during the "remaining l ife of the repurchase option"). For each buyback program, we assess the managers' timing skills by computing:
15 Our test for the implementation skills focuses on the managers' ability in minimizing costs. We recognize that firms can have other objectives when they repurchase shares . The presence of these firms in our sample will bias against us in finding significant implementation skills in our empirical tests . 16 We thank Theo Vermaelen for suggesting the idea underlying this measure of buyback implementation skills.
where C i is the actual cost of the program and
C is the average cost of a random buyback plan that yields the same number of reacquired shares except that the average price is computed over the period following a given repurchase day. In addition, T i is the end date of the program,
denotes the average price on the second trading line between the current date and the end of the program, and N i,t is the number of shares repurchased on a given day.
Since the stock price on the second trading line is only observed when a transaction takes place on this market segment, we define
p is the average premium paid during this program. 17 The average price on the second trading line can then be extracted from the time-
We can grasp the essence of the OBIS measure intuitively. The first term in Equation (8) captures whether the price paid by the company at a given point in time is less than the average price over the remainder of the program. Note that we only consider future stock prices in order to be consistent with the idea that, when repurchasing, the firm exercises an option to buy a stock that may have been exercised at any point until the expiration of the buyback program. The second term in Equation (8) is a weighting factor reflecting the relative importance of a given daily repurchase.
For each variable of buyback implementation skills ( BIS and OBIS), we interpret a value greater than one as evidence of buyback implementation skills whereas ratios smaller than one can mean either no skills or incompetence. To assess the statistical significance of each skills measure, we compute a t -statistic for each program using the bootstrapping approach of Brockman and Chung (2001) . We consider as given for each program (1) the repurchasing period, (2) the total number of reacquired shares, and (3) the number of reacquired shares during each repurchase day. For each program, we randomly generate 50,000 repurchase strategies holding constant (1), (2), and (3) and we only allow the timing of the strategy to vary from simulation to simulation.
18 From the bootstrapped distribution of the average cost, we compute for each program the standard-deviation of the skills measure and the t-statistic.
We show in Table 2 that the BIS measure identifies 15 programs for which managers display significant buyback implementation skills, whereas the OBIS measure classifies 24 programs as programs with significant implementation skills. 19 For the programs with significant BIS, the mean (median) cost represents on average 113.2% (109.2%) of the actual cost. According to the OBIS measure, the actual cost paid by firms with significant buyback implementation skills is 11.7% less than the mean cost and 6.0% less than the median cost. Depending on the measure of timing ability, we find that the proportion of the programs that display significant buyback implementation skills at the 5% level is between 28% and 45%, which is comparable to the timing perfo rmance of managers in Hong Kong analyzed in Brockman and Chung (2001) . The remaining programs in our sample display either no buyback implementation skills or some significant bad timing. A simple regression analysis (results not reported)
shows that buyback implementation ability is significantly positively associated with the program length and share capital reduction but not associated with the average premium. In the following subsection, we question whether buyback implementation skills reflect the strategic behavior of the managers in charge of implementing the buybacks. Table 2 > 
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Strategic Trading
In order to pursue one step further our analysis of the timing of buybacks, w e study the relationship between stock repurchase activity, stock prices, and firm-specific information.
Most of the empirical studies on insider trading analyze the impact on share prices or market liquidity of individuals with private information (Meulbroek, 1992 , Cornell and Sirri, 1992 , and Fishe and Robe, 2004 ) and insiders' abnormal performance when trading on their own account (Seyhun, 1986, and Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser, 2003 would expect higher repurchase activities around the release of firm specific information, but especially prior to the release of good firm-specific news, and after the release of bad firmspecific news. The abnormal repurchase activities should be particularly high if the market overreacts to bad news. Cook, Krigman and Leach (2004) show for a sample of U.S. firms that repurchase activity is significantly curtailed around firm-specific information releases.
They conclude that trading on private information is not evident in their sample.
To detect any abnormal trading activity around the release of firm-specific news, we pool all the programs and estimate the following PROBIT regression model: 
where Buyback i is a binary variable equal to one if the firm repurchases some shares and zero otherwise and R i is the return of firm i on a given day. The variable News is a binary variable set to one if the firm makes a public announcement on a given day and zero otherwise. We retrieve every news item using the Dow Jones & Reuters Factiva database. 21 We break down the period surrounding a firm-specific information release into a five day pre-release period, a release day, and a five day post-release period. Controls represents a set of control variables including the firm's market capitalization and market-to-book ratio, the program l ength and percentage share capital reduction, and the buyback completion rate up to date.
We report in Table 3 the parameter estimates for all programs, as well as for programs with significant buyback implementation skills. We find that firms repurchase more frequently in 20 Cook, Krigman and Leach (2003) use questionnaires returned by U.S. repurchasing firms to document claimed and actual compliance to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) guidelines. For their set of fifty-four companies, they show that virtually all firms violate at one time or at another the safe harbor's bounds advised by the SEC. 21 We limit the search to news items announced by the Swiss News Agency (ATS). We only consider firmspecific news items and do not include general news items in which a company is only mentioned. In the eventuality that the release takes place after the closing time of the stock market, we use the following day as the announcement day.
days following price drops ( Vermaelen (2000) using quarterly and monthly data, respectively. It is also consistent with the few studies using daily repurchase data (Cook, Krigman and Leach, 2004 and Zhang, 2005) .
Furthermore, we find that firms repurchase more frequently when the contemporaneous return on the stock is negative ( 0 2 < β ). These first two pieces of evidence are consistent with the price-support hypothesis.
Unlike previous empirical studies, we find that repurchasing firms appear to consistently repurchase in advance of price increases (
). This unusual result may be caused by the very nature of the second trading line method. Indeed, as transactions on second trading lines are instantaneous public information, market participants can interpret a repurchase as a positive signal revealing that the company's management team estimates that the stock is currently undervalued. Alternatively, the evidence may suggest that Swiss managers can anticipate future price changes. Overall we conclude that the firms included in our sample are price-sensitive repurchasers.
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For the full sample of programs, we find that repurchasing firms are more active after a public announcement and less active prior to a public announcement. We observe a similar trading pattern when we only focus on programs with implementation skills. This general reluctance to trade before a news release is particularly strong prior to quarterly and annual earnings announcements. This last point supports the idea that Swiss companies strictly conform to Swiss regulation prohibiting repurchasing during the 10-day period preceding earnings announcements or the release of any price-sensitive information.
The findings regarding control variables are generally consistent with expectations. For instance, l arge firms, which have been very active in repurchasing shares over our sample period, tend to trade more frequently, everything else being constant. Moreover, the daily 22 We use the BIS variable to select the firms exhibiting significant implementation skills since this measure is the more conservative than the OBIS measure.
repurchase decision turns out to be negatively related to the length of the program and positively related to the relative size of the buyback program.
To investigate further the effect of public announcements on the daily buyback decision, we contrast trading patterns around good news and bad news. To do so, we estimate the following PROBIT regression model: where Good News (respectively Bad News) is a binary variable that is assigned a value of one if the firm releases a good (bad) news on a given day. We designate every piece of news as good (respectively bad) if the return of the concerned company is positive (negative) on the announcement day. In this regression model, four estimates allow us to detect whether managers behave opportunistically when implementing repurchase programs. Strategic trading would consist in repurchasing before good news releases (γ 3 > 0) since stock prices are likely to increase after such announcements, and after bad news releases (γ 4 > 0) since stock prices are likely to decrease after such announcements. For similar reasons, i t would also imply not to repurchase right after a good news release (γ 1 < 0) and just before a bad news release (γ 6 < 0). Table 4 presents the regression results. We see that firms are more likely to repurchase their shares after releasing good news and less likely to do so prior to releasing good news, which is in clear opposition to the opportunistic repurchase hypothesis. Moreover, we do not detect any abnormal repurchase activity following bad news releases. The only piece of supportive evidence of the opportunistic repurchase hypothesis is that firms i n our sample curtail their repurchases in the five-day period preceding the release of bad news ( 6 γ < 0). We reach similar conclusions when we limit the analysis to earnings announcements only. However, in this case, the pre-announceme nt trading blackout is much stronger and independent of the news content.
As a robustness check, we repeat the same analysis using abnormal returns in excess of the market return instead of raw returns to separate good news and bad news. In that case, a given piece of news is said to be good (respectively bad) if the abnormal return of the concerned company is positive (negative) on the announcement day. We see in Table 5 that our conclusions remain unchanged.
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Our methodology allows us to analyze the timing of buybacks controlling for the possibility of opportunistic trading based on private information. While implementation ability is the faculty to repurchase stock at a relatively low price, typically after a price drop or prior to a price increase, opportunistic trading consists of using private information around corporate announcements to time actual repurchases. We claim that, once implementation ability has been identified, the burden of the proof of opportunistic trading is still upon researchers'
shoulders. It requires a careful analysis of the daily repurchase decision around public announcements. In our sample, we find that managers exhibit implementation ability for the majority of programs. We also document that the daily repurchase decision is statistically associated with short-term price changes. However, we reject the opportunistic repurchase hypothesis and find no evidence of firms increasing their repurchases before releasing good news or after disclosing bad news.
Trading Activity and Corporate Liquidity
While in the previous section we intended to answer the question "When do firms As far as second trading lines are concerned, the two aforementioned hypotheses do not straightforwardly apply. Indeed, when trading on a separate trading line, the company is not competing directly with the liquidity providers, nor is it increasing the probability of trading with an informed trader in the stock market. We claim that the existence of the second trading line affects the liquidity of the first trading line (1) through the information effect of actual buybacks and (2) through the identity of the sellers on the second trading line.
The information effect works as follows. Since actual buybacks on the second trading line are instantaneous ly disclosed to all market participants, the firm sends a positive signal to the market every time it trades. If the firm's managers are assumed to be better informed than the rest of the market, the positive signal from the firm attracts more investors on the first trading line which ceteris paribus tends to increase trading activity and improve liquidity. We first analyze the effects of actual buybacks on the repurchasing firms' trading volumes on the first trading line. (11) where Volume represents the daily number of shares traded on the first trading line. The parameter estimate that captures any systematic effect of buybacks on trading activity is the one associated with the Buyback variable, which is a binary variable equal to one if the firm repurchases some shares and zero otherwise. Note that we also use the Intensity variable in replacement of the Buyback variable to check whether our conclusions depend on the portion of buyback program reacquired on a given day. The control variables used in our regression model are rather standard: Price denotes the closing price of the stock, Volatility is the absolute open-close return of the stock, and Market Capitalization is the market value of the firm. Table 6 presents the OLS parameter estimates and associated p-values for Equation (11).
Consistent with the univariate tests, we find that repurchasing on a second trading l ine contributes to increase trading activity in the stock market (p-value = 0.001). We reach a similar conclusio n when the portion of the buyback program reacquired on a given day, 23 In order not to give an excessive weight to firms with large trading volumes, we scale the liquidity measures in each sample by the firm's unconditional average liquidity measure. As an illustration, consider firms A and B. Let firm A's average trading volume be 100 (in million CHF), average trading volume on repurchase days be 120, and average trading volume on non-repurchase days be 80. Let firm B's average trading volume be 15 (in million CHF), average trading volume on repurchase days be 20, and average trading volume on non-repurchase days be 10. The scaled average trading volume on repurchase days is 1.20 for firm A and 1.33 for firm B and the scaled average trading volume on non-repurchase days is 0.80 for firm A and 0.66 for firm B.
Intensity, is used in place of the repurchase-day dummy variable, Buyback. Furthermore, the signs of the coefficient estimates associated with the control variables are consistent with microstructure theory. Moreover, the subperiod analysis indicates that our results are robust over time.
< Insert Table 6 >
To study the liquidity effects of actual buybacks on the first trading line, we compile bid-ask spread and depth measures using trade and quote data over a 21-month period from October Following prior research, we also use price, volatility and volume as control variables in our analysis. Price is the median transaction price across all trades during the day, volatility is the intraday volatility of trade-by-trade logarithmic returns across all trades, and volume is the daily trading volume in number of shares.
We examine the liquidity effects using the following regression:
where Liquidity represents alternatively the bid-ask quoted spread, relative bid-ask quoted spread, total depth in number of shares, and total depth in value. As in the Volume regression above, we also use the Intensity variable in replacement of the Buyback variable. Table 7 presents the OLS parameter estimates and associated p-values for Equation (12 Intensity variable is positive and highly significant. This result also indicates that buyback activity on the second t rading line have a beneficial effect on the firm liquidity on the first trading line. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients on the control variables have generally the expected sign. In particular, higher volumes are associated with higher firm liquidity and higher volatility is associated with lower liquidity. Furthermore, as expected, price is positively correlated with spread and depth measures that are expressed in value.
< Insert Table 7 >
Results presented in Tables 6 and 7 are clear and unambiguo us evidence that repurchases on second trading lines improve the liquidity of the repurchasing firms. We find that when one controls for the key variables affecting stock liquidity, trading volumes and total depth on the first trading lines tend to be higher on repurchase days and bid-ask spreads tend to be smaller on repurchase days. Our results are consistent with the presence of arbitrageurs taking simultaneous positions on both market segments. The evidence is also supportive of the beneficial impact on market liquidity resulting from new investors entering the market in reaction to the firms' actual repurchases.
Conclusion
This paper studies a unique buyback method allowing firms to reacquire shares on a separate trading line where only the firm i s allowed to buy shares. This temporary trading platform is opened concurrently with the original trading line on the stock exchange. This method is called the Second Trading Line and has been extensively used by Swiss companies since 1997. We theoretically derive the buyback participation rules for every type of stock market participant and we show that it is never optimal for an individual investor to sell her shares on a second trading line. Using actual repurchase data from all buyback programs implemented through a second trading line on the Swiss stock market, we find that managers exhibit buyback implementation skills for the majority of programs. We also report that the daily repurchase decision is statistically associated with short-term price changes. In particular, we find that firms increase repurchasing in days following price drops and in advance of price increases. However, we reject the opportunistic repurchase hypothesis and find no evidence of firms increasing repurchases before releasing good news or after disclosing bad news.
Since the second trading lines eliminate the adverse selection problem inherently associated with open market buybacks, it offers a unique opportunity to test the impact of buybacks on the liquidity of repurchasing firms. We empirically show that repurchases on second trading lines do have a beneficial impact on the liquidity of the underlying stock. We find that, after controlling for the key variables affecting stock liquidity, trading volumes and total depths on the first trading line tend to be higher on repurchase days and bid-ask spreads tend to be smaller on repurchase days.
We have shown that second trading lines offer many attractive features to financial regulatory authorities and market participants. The key advantage for regulatory bodies is that firms' actual repurchases can be tracked in real time, which makes disclosure requirements totally While the optimal level of information disclosure in financial markets remains a very debatable issue in the literature, recent changes in the regulation of repurchase activity in the US call for more disclosure. Indeed, according to the newly mandated disclosure rule (SEC Rule 10b-18), the number of shares and the average price paid by the repurchasing firms are required in quarterly and annual reports for periods ending after March 15, 2004. With this change in regulation, the U.S. buyback information environment evolves from one with no disclosure requirement (a level 0 requirement) to a compulsory delayed disclosure environment (a level 1 disclosure). Similar disclosure environments are found for instance in Canada, France, Hong Kong, and Japan. As exposed in this paper, a level 2 requirement would be the i nstantaneous disclosure implemented through second trading lines.
Conceptually, an even more stringent information disclosure requirement ( a level 3 requirement ) would require a firm commitment and systematic preannouncement of the size Ginglinger, E., Hamon, J., 2005. Actual share repurchases and corporate liquidity. Working paper, University Paris-Dauphine. Note: This table presents some descriptive statistics on managers' buyback imple mentation skills . Our first measure of managers' implementation skills (BIS ) is obtained by dividing the actual cost of the program by the average cost of a buyback plan that yields the same number of reacquired shares. Our second measure of managers' implementation skills (OBIS) is obtained by dividing the actual cost of the program by the average cost of a buyback plan that yields the same number of reacquired shares except that the average price is computed over the period following a given repurchase day. For both measures , a ratio greater than one implies that there is implementation skills and a ratio smaller than one implies that there is no implementation skills . Significant t-statistics gives the number of programs for which the associated t-statistic is greater than 1.96 in absolute value. The t -statistics are computed using a bootstrapped approach based on 50,000 simulated equivalent repurchase strategies . Note: This table presents the parameter estimates computed from a pooled-sample PROBIT regression: 
Buyback i is a binary variable equal to one if the firm repurchases some shares and zero otherwise and R i is the return of firm i. The variable News is a binary variable set to one if the firm makes a public announcement on a given day and zero otherwise. In the last two columns, the news variable is defined using earnings related news only. Controls represents a set of control variables including the firm's market capitalization and market-to-book ratio, the program length and share capital reduction (in %), and the buyback completion rate up to date. We run the regressions for all programs ( Whole Sample), as well as for programs with significant buyback implementation skills according to the BIS measure (Skilled Managers). The p-values presented into parentheses have been computed using Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. a indicates that the coefficient estimate has been multiplied by 10 5 . * (**, ***) indicates coefficients significantly different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) confidence level. Note: This table presents the parameter estimates computed from a pooled-sample PROBIT regression: Buyback i is a binary variable equal to one if the firm repurchases some shares and zero otherwise and R i is the return of firm i. Good News (respectively Bad News) is a binary variable that is assigned a value of one if the firm releases a good (bad) news on a given day. We designate every piece of news as good (respectively bad) if the raw return of the concerned company is positive (negative) on the announcement day. In the last two columns, the news variables are defined using earnings related news only. Controls represents a set of control variables including the firm's market capitalization and market-to-book ratio, the program length and share capital reduction (in %), and the buyback completion rate up to date. We run the regressions for all programs (Whole Sample), as well as for programs with significant buyback implementation skills according to the BIS measure (Skilled Managers). The p-values presented into parentheses have been computed using Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. a indicates that the coefficient estimate has been multiplied by 10 5 . * (**, ***) indicates coefficients significantly different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) confidence level. Buyback i is a binary variable equal to one if the firm repurchases some shares and zero otherwise and R i is the return of firm i. Good News (respectively Bad News) is a binary variable that is assigned a value of one if the firm releases a good (bad) news on a given day. We designate every piece of news as good (respectively bad) if the abnormal return of the concerned company is positive (negative) on the announcement day. In the last two columns, the news variables are defined using earnings related news only. Controls represents a set of control variables including the firm's market capitalization and market-to-book ratio, the program length and share capital reduction (in %), and the buyback completion rate up to date. We run the regressions for all programs (Whole Sample), as well as for programs with significant buyback implementation skills according to the BIS measure (Skilled Managers). The p-values presented into parentheses have been computed using Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. a indicates that the coefficient estimate has been multiplied by 10 5 . * (**, ***) indicates coefficients significantly different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) confidence level. Liquidity alternatively represents the acquiring firm's bid-ask quoted spread, relative bid-ask quoted spread (quoted bid-ask spread divided by midpoint price), total depth in number of shares, and total depth in value on the first trading line. The depth variables are expressed in thousands. The alternative liquidity measures are the median values across all trades during the day. Buyback i is a binary variable equal to one if the firm repurchases some shares and zero otherwise. Intensity is the fraction of the announced program size repurchased on a given day and is used in replacement of the Buyback variable. Price denotes the median transaction price across all trades during the day, Volatility is the intraday volatility of trade-by-trade logarithmic returns across all trades during the day, and Volume is the daily trading volume in number of shares. The pvalues presented into parentheses have been computed using White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. a indicates that the coefficient estimate has been multiplied by 10 5 . * (**, ***) indicates coefficients significantly different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) confidence level. Note: These graphs represent the reserve premia for individual investors (upper graphs), institutional investors and arbitrageurs (medium graphs), and tax-exempted institutional investors (lower graph). The reserve premium is defined as the percentage premium for which a given market participant is indifferent between tendering her shares on a second trading line program or directly selling them in the stock market. The exact expressions for the reserve premia are presented in Equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. For each market participant, we plot the associated reserve premium for a time period until the end of the fiscal year (τ) ranging from 0 to 1 year, different risk-free interest rate levels , r = 1%, 3%, and 5%, and different income tax rates (t I ) or capital gain tax rates (t G ), 30% and 50%. The value of the current stock price (P) is assumed to be 100 and the nominal value of one share (V) is assumed to be 1. 
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